MSc in Business and Economics Jørn Anders Bjørhovde Nilsen at School of Business and Economics (HHA) will Tuesday 16th of June 2026 hold his trial lecture and defend his thesis for the PhD degree in Social Science.
Trial lecture on assigned topic will take place at 10:15: "From decision-usefulness to policy usefulness: the changing political economy of accounting information"
Later, at 12.15 he will defend his thesis entitled: "Accounting Information in a Political Economy - Three essays on the comparative effectiveness of accounting-based governance mechanisms"
This dissertation examines how accounting information functions as a governance mechanism in political and institutional settings. It studies how firms, regulators, and market participants respond when accounting measures are used in taxation, crisis-support programs, and lightly regulated capital markets.
The first essay analyzes how firms respond when measures of profitability become central to tax policy in a politically sensitive Norwegian industry. Consistent with political cost theory, firms have incentives to reduce exposure to redistribution, but the evidence shows limited use of reporting-based responses when political pressure is uncertain and diffuse. Once policy becomes credible, firms adjust more actively. These responses vary across ownership structures and business groups, but mainly take the form of cost reallocation and political engagement rather than discretionary reporting.
The second essay evaluates an audit-based crisis-support program introduced in Norway during the COVID-19 period. It shows that front-loaded verification based on audited accounting numbers constrained opportunistic reporting among private firms, even when incentives to misreport were strong.
The third essay studies an alternative investment market and documents a persistent setting in which improved disclosure quality and stronger enforcement signals do not discipline market outcomes.
Taken together, the findings show that the effectiveness of accounting-based governance depends on institutional context. Accounting plays a limited role under diffuse political pressures, becomes effective when tied to credible verification, and is less effective when enforcement is weak. The dissertation highlights how firms and markets adjust when accounting information alone is insufficient, and draws implications for the design of regulation in private-firm settings and SME markets.
Evaluation Committee
Supervisors
Streaming
Both the trial lecture and defense and will be streamed and recorded:
Thesis
The thesis is available in Nasjonalt vitenarkiv.